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Abstract
This paper studies the problem of automated classification of fact statements and 
value statements in written judicial decisions. We compare a range of methods and 
demonstrate that the linguistic features of sentences and paragraphs can be used to 
successfully classify them along this dimension. The Wordscores method by Laver 
et al. (Am Polit Sci Rev 97(2):311–331, 2003) performs best in held out data. In an 
application, we show that the value segments of opinions are more informative than 
fact segments of the ideological direction of U.S. circuit court opinions.




The contents of court opinions comprise among other things fact statements and 
value statements. The former concerns what the legal professionals know about the 
factual grounds of a case, given all evidence then available to them. The latter, on 
the other hand, concerns what legal (and ethical, whenever relevant) principles are 
applicable given what have been stated as facts. The classic dichotomy of “facts 
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versus law” has been a major theme of legal discourse in Common Law countries 
and is known to be a major component of judicial reasoning (Greenberg 2004).
This study uses computational techniques to develop a document classifier that 
automatically distinguishes between fact and value statements in court opinions. 
The resulting delineated corpora can be used for a range of empirical studies on 
how judges reason towards decisions. For example, do judges alter facts to fit their 
judgments?
Automated fact-value distinction has indeed found many applications in recent 
empirical legal studies. To name but a few, Shulayeva et  al. (2017) highlights the 
immediate relevance of this distinction in judicial citations, since identifying factual 
grounds is the first step in drawing on legal precedents to support current decisions. 
Smith (2014) shows that judges are more likely to exercise policy preference in legal 
disputes focusing more on interpretations of facts, but less likely to do so in cases 
focusing more on interpretations of legal principles. In controlling the textual factors 
that might influence the likelihood of a case to be remanded from appellate courts 
to district courts, Sarel and Demirtas (2017) have considered whether a case raises 
more factual questions or more legal questions.
This paper presents a new corpus and approach to this problem. We start with 
an expert-labeled corpus (labeled by the judges themselves), where paragraphs are 
annotated as related to facts versus values (discussions of law). We use a new fea-
tural representation of documents based on syntactic dependencies, which captures 
what linguistically distinguishes fact statements from value statements. As this is 
exploratory research, we compare a number of models for classifying facts vs val-
ues. In a cross-model disagreement analysis, we show that our features exploit the 
linguistic structure of ruling actions and are less likely to be misled by lexical fac-
tors, though the classifier is prone to ignorance of the identity of agents of those 
actions.
To demonstrate the usefulness of the model, we use it for a downstream empirical 
analysis. We find that value sections of court opinions are more informative of the 
ideological direction of an opinion than the fact sections (although both are predic-
tive). Future work could use fact-value labels of legal text for many relevant empiri-
cal investigations.
The organization of the paper is as follows. After a review of related works in 
Sects. 2 and 3 provides the motivations and details of our feature extraction. Sec-
tion 4 reports two experiments, the supervised learning and the disagreement analy-
sis that inspects model behaviors against individual texts. After showing an empiri-
cal application of our model in Sects. 5 and 6 concludes.
2  Background and related works
By fact-value distinction we mean the distinction between linguistic statements 
about facts (i.e., descriptive) and values (i.e., normative). We do not get into the 
broader epistemological distinction between facts per se and values per se (e.g., 
Mulligan and Correia 2017; Schroeder 2016).
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Fact-value distinction is similar to and sometimes confused with subjective-
objective and fact-opinion distinctions (Corvino 2014). From Corvino’s discussion 
the differences between the three distinctions are repeated as follows:
• Facts vs. values “[fact statements] describe the world; [value statements] evalu-
ate it.”
• Subjective vs. objective subjective statements are “mind-dependent” (in the sense 
that the truth of the statement is sensitive to the choice of attitude-holders); 
objective statements are “mind-independent” (in the sense that the truth of such 
a statement can be verified independently of attitude holders).
• Facts vs. opinions fact statements are “objective and well supported by the avail-
able evidence”; opinion statements are “either subjective or else not well sup-
ported by the available evidence.”
These should have made clear the importance of keeping the three distinctions apart. 
For one thing, it is controversial whether all value statements are subjective (e.g., 
Corvino mentions that many argue against the view the moral beliefs are subjec-
tive), and opinions can be descriptive (Corvino’s own example, God exists) rather 
than normative.
That said, subjective-objective distinction, a.k.a. subjectivity classification, is by 
far a better studied text classification task, typically at sentence-level and in jux-
taposition with sentence-level sentiment classification, i.e., to determine whether a 
subjective sentence expresses a positive or negative attitude; see Liu (2010) for a 
review. Works on subjectivity classification have capitalized on supervised learning 
methods such as the naïve Bayesian classifier, using features like unigrams, syntactic 
dependencies, and occurrences of the terms or syntactic patterns in a pre-determined 
or bootstrapping-induced dictionary (Hatzivassiloglou and Wiebe 2000; Riloff and 
Wiebe 2003; Wilson et al. 2004; Yu and Hatzivassiloglou 2003).
These practices have understandably influenced research in automated fact-value 
distinction in legal contexts. In the law, these distinctions are important because they 
can influence decisions in high-stakes legal disputes. They can also influence policy 
through judges setting precedents. In Smith (2014), a list of terms highly indicative 
of factual statements and a list of terms highly indicative of legal statements are 
manually created based on a statistical analysis of 142 annotated opinions drawn 
from United States Courts of Appeals Database (Hurwitz and Kuersten 2012). For 
a given opinion, a function of the standardized frequencies (see “Appendix 1” for 
details) of the terms in each list is taken as a quantitative measure of the extent to 
which the opinion concerns the kind of statements the respective list pertains to. 
Similarly, applying Laver et al.’s (2003) Wordscore algorithm, Sarel and Demirtas 
(2017) use two dictionaries, Black’s Law Dictionary as an index of legal texts and 
The Oxford Thesaurus as an index of factual texts, to calculate a score of a given text 
that measures its legality or factuality. The score in question sums up the pre-calcu-
lated scores of the bigrams in the respective dictionary, weighted by their frequen-
cies (see “Appendix 2” for details).
Both Smith’s and Sarel and Demirtas’s methods are reminiscent of a simple 
text representation strategy known as bag-of-words (BOW), except that rather than 
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keeping track of the individual frequencies of “words”, they are collapsed into a 
single measure. In neither study has that measure been converted to a classifica-
tion judgment—which can be easily done, however, as in Sect. 4—since their foci 
are establishing the numeric correlation of that measure with another variable of 
interest.
To date the only study in this area that sets accurate classification as its primary 
goal is Shulayeva et al. (2017), where the authors adopt the standard featural repre-
sentation of texts and train their naïve Bayesian classifier on 2659 annotated sen-
tences collected from 50 common law reports at the British and Irish Legal Informa-
tion Institute (BAILII). Shulayeva et al.’s model employs a wide range of features 
besides unigrams, including part of speech tags, dependency pairs, sentence length, 
sentence position, and a Boolean feature that indicates whether the sentence con-
tains a citation instance. The use of the last three features makes sense only for a 
model that works at sentence-level, like Shulayeva et al.’s.
As a final note, it is worth restating that the distinction between facts and values, 
both in concept and in language, has special meaning in law that differs from other 
contexts. The results of empirical analysis of the fact-value distinction in legal lan-
guage will likely not be extrapolable to broader language environments.
3  Methods
In this study we transform a document into its featural representation based on the 
syntactic dependencies it contains, like Shulayeva et al. (2017). But unlike the latter, 
here dependencies serve to subcategorize lexical items, and the lexical items so sub-
categorized are all that is needed. Below let us start with an observation concerning 
the linguistic properties of fact and values statements.
3.1  Observation
Factual propositions make claims about what the state of affair was, is, or will be 
like, whereas normative propositions make claims about what the state of affair 
should or could be like, implicitly or explicitly comparing the likelihood or desir-
ability for different state of affairs to obtain. In other words, normative propositions 
are by nature factual propositions embedded under modalities or propositional atti-
tudes (see McKay and Nelson 2014; Menzel 2017 for a review), which are encoded 
in English with modals, e.g., can, may, must, should, etc., and attitude verbs, e.g., 
believe, uphold, maintain, require, etc., respectively.
The above linguistic observation, we emphasize, applies to English language in 
general and judicial opinions in particular. The following value statements, taken 
from the United States Circuit Court Opinion Database, illustrate the use of modals 
and attitudes:
The principle established has also been affirmed by so many decisions in the 
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Roman Catholic Church v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 207 F.1d 897 (1913)
It bears repeating that this appeal is brought only by the individual officers, 
not the City of Corinth, ... And, it is well to remember that qualified immu-
nity serves a number of quite important goals. Courts have expressed a con-
cern over ‘the deterrent effect that civil liability may have on the willingness 
of public officials...
Hare v. Corinth, 135 F.3d 320 (1998)
In instances in which we uphold the trial court’s determination that the 
appeal is not taken in good faith... payment of the full appellate filing fees and 
costs, less what has already been collected, must be made within 30 days or 
the appeal will be dismissed for want of prosecution.
Robert L. Baugh v. Joe M. Taylor E. Nevelow P. Evans, 117 F.3d 197 (1997)
By contrast, these value indicators are typically missing in fact statements:
The regular train crews had done and still do this work. They are employees of 
the railroads—called the tenant lines—which use the station’s terminal facili-
ties.
Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F.2d 235 (1941)
Following this injection, Amanda began to show signs of illness—fever, leth-
argy, and seizures. She was given a second DPT shot on April 20, 1979, after 
which the seizures became more frequent.
Beck v. Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services,
924 F.2d 1029 (1991)
The Board denied the request on June 6th for failure by petitioner to justify the 
delay in requesting an extension of time. On August 29th, petitioner requested 
reconsideration of the denial.
Jacinto S. Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (1991)
Shulayeva et al. (2017) also associate modals with legal principles. The statistical 
analysis of Smith (2014) confirms that certain propositional attitudes are more likely 
to occur in law-bound texts.
3.2  Features
Since value statements usually embed fact statements under modals and attitudes, a 
proper feature extraction needs to reflect this structural property. Syntactic depend-
encies are an easily obtainable encoding that satisfies the requirement, and have 
been successfully applied to subjectivity classification, (e.g., Wilson et  al. 2004), 
stance classification (e.g., Hasan and Ng 2014), and fact-value distinction (e.g., Shu-
layeva et al. 2017).
As an example, in Fig. 1, the fact that brought depends on repeating as a clausal 
complement (CCOMP) marks embedding this appeal is brought ... under repeating, 
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an attitude verb. The embedded clause itself passes for a fact statement while the 
whole sentence conveys a ruling.
There are a number of ways to employ dependency features (see Wilson et  al. 
2004; Hasan and Ng 2014). We propose to use word-dependency-name pairs, e.g., 
repeat-CCOMP. This amounts to subcategorizing words with dependency labels, 
e.g., in place of a single feature bear, we have bear-NSUBJ, bear-XCOMP, etc.
Compared to Shulayeva et al. (2017) where word-dependent pairs are used (e.g., 
repeat-bring), our approach generalizes across dependents in the same syntac-
tic environment (e.g., repeat-bring and repeat-give reduce to repeat-
CCOMP) and thus is less prone to the problem of feature sparsity.
One could argue that the occurrence of certain tokens alone, especially in case of 
nouns, is sufficiently indicative of whether a statement is about facts or values (see 
Smith 2014 for instances). Thus following previous works, we also incorporate uni-
gram features.
We still need to consider (engineering) the values of the features. Multiple 
options are there in the literature, such as raw counts, counts clipped at one, frequen-
cies, etc. In a pilot study we find the following frequency-like measure works well:
That is, the count of a feature is weighted by the logarithmic length of the document, 
if greater than one. Obviously, the measure grows less quickly in proportion to the 
document length than word frequency.
4  Experiments
To evaluate the effectiveness of our dependency-based featural representation and to 
understand its behavior in judicial opinions, we conducted two experiments. In the 
first one, the supervised learning, a MLP classifier on top of our featural representa-
tion is trained and validated on the aforementioned dataset fraction. For compari-









Fig. 1  Major synactic dependencies in it bears repeating that this appeal is brought .... Hare v. Corinth, 
135 F.3d 320 (1998)
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(2014), Sarel and Demirtas (2017) and used BOW and doc2vec (Le and Mikolov 
2014) as the baselines. It is shown that our model has achieved a competitive perfor-
mance. The second experiment focuses on cases where the classification predictions 
by different models disagree. A qualitative analysis provides some insights about 
pros and cons of our featural representation, how it would avail and when it might 
fail.
4.1  Corpus and preparation
Our corpus comprises the full set of judicial opinions from CourtListener.com, span-
ning over a wide range of U.S. courts and years. This corpus includes 216 courts and 
the corpus goes back to the 1800s for some courts.
Out of this comprehensive corpus, we start by identifying cases where we can 
extract labeled data for facts and law (value). There are many opinions where we can 
delineate the “fact” and “value” sections of the opinions using the expert labels pro-
vided by the authoring judges. In particular, we identify sections by headers using 
regular expressions based on preceding roman numerals.
We then categorize headers that clearly identify fact sections versus law/value 
sections. For example, a header beginning with adequacy of or challenges to is taken 
to label a value document concerning legal standards, whereas a header beginning 
with factual background or procedural history is taken to label a factual document. 
The complete lists of the headers we assume to be fact-indicating and value-indicat-
ing are given in Table 1. Following this procedure, we obtain 23,497 case sections.
Using these headers is not the only way that one could have built a labeled cor-
pus. A disadvantage is that fact sections often contain some value statements, and 
value sections often contain law statements. We also lose a lot of data from sections 
that are not labeled according to our pattern matching algorithm. The most strin-
gent, but also most costly, solution would be to have legal experts read opinions and 
extract fact and value statements at the sentence level. We attempted this at an early 
stage of this project and quickly realized that it would be prohibitively costly. Even 
Table 1  Headers taken as the ground truths
Fact-indicating Value-indicating
Background, evidence, evidence of, existence of, 
fact, facts, factual, findings of fact, procedural 
history
Abandonment, ability, acceptance of, accrual of, 
adequacy of, administrative, admissibility of, 
admission of, affidavit of, affidavits of, allega-
tions of, analysis of, appeal of, applicability 
of, applicable, application of, assignments of, 
challenges to, claims against, common law, 
compliance with, competency of, conclusion, 
consideration of, constitutional, constitutional-
ity of, contentions of, decision of, discussion, 
dismissal of, district court, federal, improper, 
jurisdiction, law, motion to, rule, sentencing, 
standards for, statutory
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then, there were many sentences that the law students could not confidently annotate 
as purely factual or purely legalistic.
We therefore made a choice that the annotations of judges (in the section headers) 
were sufficient for our purpose. We found that with statement-level annotations, they 
were much higher in the fact-labeled sections. From reading the sections ourselves, 
we could tell that the labels were identifying paragraphs that tended to discuss facts 
on the one hand and law/values on the other. Future work could do more to build an 
effective corpus of fact vs value statements.
The next step is to consider the linguistic unit under which to do our analysis. 
From a linguistic perspective, paragraphs can be regarded as the smallest discourse 
unit where a number of congruent sentences jointly develop a single idea. We thus 
consider the proper granularity level on which a fact-value classifier works to be that 
of paragraphs. Besides the practical needs of many downstream empirical analyses, 
our intuition is that readers can better determine whether a paragraph is about facts 
or values than they can do with either a single sentence, whose interpretation is sus-
ceptible to those surrounding it, or a longer document, which may consist of para-
graphs pertinent to both facts and values. In addition, whole sections vary in their 
length much more than paragraphs. Therefore token frequencies are more compara-
ble by paragraph.
With this in mind, we segment each case section into a paragraph, where para-
graph boundaries are annotated by HTML markup. We end up with a dataset con-
sisting of 1,301,609 paragraph-sized documents, 36.5% of which are fact-bound and 
63.5% of which are value-bound. This class imbalance is due to more section head-
ers having our value labels, relative to our fact labels. We take 80% of dataset to be 
the training-development set, and hold out the remaining 20% as the test set.
Our learning task requires dependency parsing, a time-consuming procedure for 
any natural language processing toolkit on the market, e.g., spaCy (Honnibal and 
Johnson 2015) used here, in face of the sheer size of the dataset. Thus for now we 
use only a small fraction of the latter, containing 1000 fact instances and 1000 value 
instances randomly sampled from the training-development set. This fraction forms 
the basis of our supervised learning experiment; its scale is still larger than or com-
parable with those of the corpora used in the works reviewed previously.
All the texts in the dataset are cleaned by removing footnote numbers, but num-
bers for sections, chapters, and law references are preserved. A pilot study over a 
small development dataset shows that numbers of the latter category but not the for-
mer are indicative of texts on application of legal principles.
4.2  Supervised learning
The classifiers used in this experiment are implemented with the machine learning 
library scikit-learn (Buitinck et al. 2013). As this is exploratory research using a new 
corpus, we feel it is important to compare many supervised learning approaches. We 
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compare an array of methods from the literature and two baselines commonly used 
in text classification, as detailed below. 
 (i) DEPN: our method, using words subcategorized by dependency names as fea-
tures. The feature vocabulary is clipped to the top 4000 items occurring most 
frequently in the training set. The feature value is as introduced in Sect. 3.2. 
The representation is fed to a MLP classifier with two 500-dimensional hidden 
layers.1 Other settings of the MLP are as scikit-learn’s default.
 (ii) DEPW: using word-dependent as features, following Shulayeva et al. (2017). 
The construction of the feature vocabulary, feature value assignment, and the 
MLP classifier set-up are the same as DEPN.
 (iii) SMITH: a BOW-like method implementing Smith (2014) with adaptions. It uses 
predetermined words indicative of facts or values as features and standard-
ized frequencies as feature values. Vectorization outputs are fed to a Logistic 
Regression classifier.
 (iv) WS: a BOW-like method implementing WordScore (Laver et al. 2003; Sarel 
and Demirtas 2017). Each word in the training set is assigned a fact- or value-
inclination score. The score of a document is the re-scaled sum of the fre-
quency-weighted scores of the words it contains (see “Appendix 2”).
 (v) BOW: a baseline using word, i.e., unigram features. The construction of feature 
vocabulary and feature value assignment are the same as DEPN. Vectorization 
outputs are fed to a Logistic Regression classifier.
 (vi) D2V: a baseline using Gensim toolkit’s (Řehůřek and Sojka 2010) implemen-
tation of doc2vec (Le and Mikolov 2014) for document vectorization. The 
outputs are fed to a MLP classifier, with the same set-up as DEPN.
The results of fivefold cross validation are reported in Table  2. The ws model 
achieves the highest F1 scores in detecting both fact and value statements, but 
another BOW-like model, smith, does not perform as well. The F1 scores of the depn 
Table 2  Fivefold cross 
validation
Bold indicates it is the highest-F1 specification (best at predicting 
facts, in the left column, and best at predicting values, in the right 
column)







1 We choose MLP because it supports training in batches, which is very helpful when we move on to 
training our model over the entire corpus in the future.
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model are slightly better than those of the depw model, which does not obviously 
outdo the the baseline bow model. The only neural model d2v has the lowest per-
formance, suggesting that it is not as sensitive to fact-value distinctions as it might 
be in other topic-identifying domains. All other models have similar performance in 
identifying fact and value statements, suggesting that training on a balanced corpus 
like ours will not introduce identification bias to a feature-based classifier.
It is worth mentioning that Shulayeva et al. (2017) report F1 scores ≥ 81 for their 
sentence-level classifier trained and tested on a manually annotated dataset (2659 
sentences; 60% neutral, 30% values, and 10% facts). The old caveat remains that no 
meaningful model comparison can be made when the training configuration or the 
test base differs. For the next step, it would be interesting to have our depn and depw 
models’ performance evaluated on Shulayeva et al.’s dataset.
4.3  Disagreement analysis
In the second experiment, we inspect on the judicial documents on which the clas-
sification predictions by the previous models vary. By doing so we may gain some 
insights into the behaviors of these models. We leave aside the two baselines and 
focus on the first four models evaluated above, as there is no need for cross valida-
tion here. We re-trained the four models on a larger fraction of the training-develop-
ment set, comprising 10,000 fact instances and 10,000 value instances and had them 
tested against 100 examples (50% facts, 50%values) randomly sampled from the test 
set.
The judgments given by the four models largely coincide: out of the 100 exam-
ples there are 74 on which the models agree. A pairwise comparison illustrates more 
details: we take the judgments given by one model as pseudo-gold standards and 
take the F1 score of the other model under comparison as the measure of coinci-
dence ratio of the two models. The results are given by Table 3, where it is shown 
that depn and depw are closer to each other than either of them is to smith or ws, 
and the latter two BOW-like models are the second most similar model pair. Inter-
estingly, though depn turns out to be the least similar model to ws, it fares better in 
the cross validation test than the other two models that are closer to ws. The inter-
pretation could be either that the pairwise coincidence measure done on the current 
small test set is not representative enough, or that how the performance of the four 
models compare to each other might be shifted by a larger training set. We will not 
pursue the issue here but simply take Table 3 for what it is.
Table 3  Pairwise coincidence 
ratio
DEPN DEPW SMITH WS
depn – 92 83.5 78.7
depw – – 80 81.8
smith – – – 84.8
ws – – – –
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Let us now focus on comparing the behavior of depn with those of others. While 
depn and depw are quite similar, when their judgments disagree, it appears that 
depw is more likely to be misled by lexical factors. For example, the following fac-
tual statement is correctly identified by depn but missed by depw, probably because 
the paragraph contains a lengthy reference to a legal case, here in boldface.
Next, the reticle is blown up 200 times–the resulting enlarged reproduction 
being called a ‘low back’ or ‘overlay.’ Once the reticle is confirmed as con-
taining the correct design, it is placed in a repeat camera which reduces the 
design to actual size and repeats it over and over again on a chrome piece 
or ‘mask’ which then becomes the actual production tool. (People v. Supe-
rior Court (Moore) (1980) 104 Cal . App. 3d 1001, 1005 [163 Cal. Rptr. 
906], italics added; see also 1984 U.S. Code Cong. Admin. News, at pp. 
5760–5763.
Label: F; depn: F; depw: V; smith: F; ws: V.
In another value statement, though the paragraph is largely made up of factual 
descriptions, but the first sentence, in boldface, makes clear that those descrip-
tions are cited as arguments in support of a judicial judgment in the background. 
Here, depn alone correctly understands the inter-sentential relationship:
The superior court provided several reasons for its finding. First, 
although Bruce had some income, “it was minimal, and much was taken to 
support his other children.” Second, “the [Eberts] neither needed nor asked 
for any support from [Bruce]” and “[Bruce’s] testimony indicates that he 
would have been willing to pay something had the [Eberts] asked him to do 
so.” Finally, Bruce “testified credibly” that he was unaware he had a legal 
obligation to pay support to the Eberts.
Label: V; depn: V; depw: F; smith: F; ws: F.
Similar observations can be made when comparing depn with smith and ws. 
Since the latter two do not take structural information into consideration, they 
might be misled in description of procedural history, especially when it comes to 
factual description of previous court decisions. depn, this time along with depw, 
is immune to this disguise:
(7) Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion. 
(8) He was denied due process as a result of the state court ’s failure to hold 
an evidentiary hearing on substantial, controverted and unresolved issues. 
(9) The trial court erred by refusing to grant a challenge for cause to juror. 
(10) The trial court abused its discretion by denying Barbee ’s motion to 
suppress alleged statements made to Detective Carroll;
Label: F; depn: F; depw: F; smith: V; ws: V.
However, sometimes depn might over-evaluate the predictive force of structural 
information and be misled by the latter. In the following factual statement, all 
other three models, including depw, give the correct judgment. But depn fails as 
if it is confused by structures for ruling actions like denied that, asserted that, 
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averred that, but overlooks the fact that the agents of these actions are subjects 
(e.g., Chris, Bs) involved in the case, not the judicial authority:
Chris answered and denied that grounds existed to terminate his parental 
rights; in a counter-petition, he asserted that he was entitled to custody 
of Landon under the “superior rights doctrine.” The Bs answered the coun-
ter-petition and averred that “[Chirs’] personal drug use and his engage-
ment in the drug trade” constituted “substantial harm that allows a court 
to deprive a natural parent of custody of a child” and that “it is contrary to 
the best interest of the child to permit [Chris] to exercise regular overnight 
visitation” with Landon.
Label: F; depn: V; depw: F; smith: F; ws: F.
Here is another example of the same kind, where both depn and depw fail:
The confessions given to law enforcement officers in July 1992 conflict with 
several other versions of the crimes Shafer gave to mental health professionals 
and with the co-defendant’s version.[3] Shafer, however, confirmed during 
the change of plea hearing that the July 1992 confessions were the true and 
correct versions of the crimes.
Label: F; depn: V; depw: V; smith: F; ws: F.
The above observations are by no means comprehensive, but they do tell us some-
thing about the behaviors of the fact-value distinguishing models under investiga-
tion, which we might reasonably conjecture given the constructs of those models. 
In sum, the more importance a model attaches to structural information, the more 
likely it would rely on presence or absence of linguistic structures for ruling actions 
to identify value statements, and the less likely it would be misled by lexical factors. 
But the cost of this gain is that such a model is also more likely to ignore important 
lexical information that reveals the identity of the ruling (or any other) actions.
5  Application
As our fact-value classification model (depn) has achieved a reasonable precision 
and sensitivity, it would be beneficial to see how its predictions could be put to prac-
tical use. Along the fields of application mentioned in Sect. 1, here we are interested 
Table 4  Fivefold cross 
validation, liberal-conservative 
distinction
Bold indicates it is the highest-F1 specification (best at predicting 
facts, in the left column, and best at predicting values, in the right 
column)
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in whether the conservative or liberal inclination of a court opinion finds a stronger 
correlation in the way it describes facts or the way it states values (i.e., applies legal 
principles). Conceivably, our hypothesis goes to the latter, since we do not expect 
judges’ conservative or liberal policy preference to influence their accounts of facts.
To test this hypothesis, we conducted another supervised learning experiment 
where the predictions of our fact-value classification model obtained in Sect.  4.3 
are used to create a term-frequency representation of court opinions that is relativ-
ized to either the fact-hood (the likelihood to be associated with fact statements) 
or value-hood (the likelihood to be associated with fact statements) of terms (see 
“Appendix 3” for details). A Logistic Regression classifier is then trained on a frac-
tion (about 5%) of the U.S. Circuit Court Opinion corpus, where each opinion has 
been manually annotated as “conservative” or “liberal” (we ignore “neutral” cases 
for this application).
We did the usual fivefold cross-validation to compare the predictive force of 
fact-weighted n-gram representations and value-weighted n-gram representations. 
Table 4 gives the results. While the absolute performance is not great, a classifier 
using value-weighted n-gram representations does perform better in distinguishing 
liberal-inclined decisions and conservative-inclined decisions. This confirms our 
expectation that the value sections of a court opinion can better predict its liberal-
ness or conservativeness.
6  Conclusion
This paper has developed a machine learning model for fact-value distinction by 
using lexical items subcategorized by the syntactic dependencies they enter. It has 
conducted two learning experiments, one to evaluate this model by comparing its 
performance with those of the methods proposed in the previous literature, and the 
other to understand how its behavior differs from its precedents by analyzing the 
texts on which their judgments differ. The results have established that dependency 
features in the way they are utilized here are useful in identifying linguistic struc-
tures that express modalities and propositional attitudes, thereby qualifying them 
as strong predictors for distinguishing fact and value statements. This is because 
value statements in the context of court opinions usually boil down to modalities 
and attitudes concerning judicial judgments or legal principles. Indirect support to 
this approach comes from yet another learning experiment, where the output of such 
a fact-value classifier feeds a downstream classification task that identifies a court 
opinion’s ideological inclination.
Our results also point out a deficiency of the current approach. Value statements 
feature not propositional attitudes or modalities in general, but those of certain hold-
ers, i.e., judicial authorities. Thus for the future, the hope is that the techniques of a 
widely applied common information task, Named Entity Recognition (NER), can be 
incorporated into the meaning representation of court opinions, so that a fact-value 
classifier can be trained to concentrate on modalities, propositional attitudes, or rul-
ing actions held by proper entities.
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Appendix 1:  Smith’s algorithm
We describe below how the so-called standardized frequencies are calculated in 
Smith (2014) to determine which lexical items are statistically indicative of fact 
statements or value statements.
Suppose w is a word in the set W of words that appear frequently enough in the 
training set. Let D be the set of training documents. The frequency of w in some 
d ∈ D is given by
The standardized frequency of w in d is defined as the ratio of the frequency of w in 
d to the mean frequency of w across all d ∈ D , i.e.,
where  denotes the mean.
Suppose that D
v
⊂ D is the subset compoesd of value statements, and Df = D�Dv 
is the subset composed of fact statements. Then we may compare the difference 
between the mean standardized frequency of w across all d ∈ D
v
 and the mean 
standardized frequency of w across all d ∈ Df  , i.e.,
If 𝛿
w
> 0 and this difference is statistically significant (p < 0.01) then w is taken to 
be statistically indicative of value statements. A similar procedure applies to deter-
mine words that are statistically indicative of fact statements.
Appendix 2: Wordscore algorithm
Here we summarize the essentials of Laver et  al.’s (2003) wordscore algorithm, 
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Let A be a function that assigns an a priori score to documents in the training set 
D. In our case, let A(d) = −1 if d is a fact statement, A(d) = 1 if d is a value state-
ment. It can be shown that if a priori we have even chance to come across any docu-
ment in D, then the probability for a document to be d upon observing the occur-
rence of w in that document is given by
The score of a word w is calculated by
Thus for a given document t in the test set T, we may calculate its score as
To ensure that {S(t)}
t∈T has the same dispersion metric as {A(d)}d∈D , S(t) is further 
re-scaled as
where  denotes the standard deviation.
Given our set-up of A, S∗(t) is converted into a categorical judgment simply as 
follows: t is a fact statement if S∗(t) ≤ 0 , a value statement otherwise.
Appendix 3: Fact‑ and value‑weighted N‑gram frequencies
For a paragraph p in a case d, our fact-value classification model provides a pre-
dicted probability fp ∈ [0, 1] that p is about facts, with numbers near one indicating 
fact patterns and numbers near zero indicating law or value patterns.
We compute the counts of terms for each paragraph, including unigrams and 
bigrams after removing stopwords, capitalization, and punctuation, and stemming 
word endings. Let 
p
(w) be the count of a term w ∈ W in the paragraph p, 
where W gives the vocabulary of n-grams in the case d.
For each paragraph p ∈ d and each term w ∈ W , we compute the fact-weighted 
count, fpp(w) , and value-weighted count (1 − fp)p(w) . Then, the fact fre-
quency of the term w in the case d is the summation over the fact-weighted counts 
over paragraphs in the case, divided by the mean fact-weighted counts over all 
n-grams:
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